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ABSTRACT 
The existing paradigm for the economic analysis of tax 
compliance provides an inadequate theory of the revenue collection 
process , Even as a purely economic model , its exclusive focus on 
individual taxpayers' decisionmaking promotes an unduly restrictive 
vision of the compliance problem and potential respo'nses to i t. In 
this paper we outline a more comprehensive theoretical basis for 
analyzing tax compliance , and illustrate it with a simple model. We 
believe our approach to be a significant improvement in the economic 
theory of l aw enforcement because it views the noncompliance problem 
as an interactive system , In our theoretical construct ,  individual 
decisionmaking not only depends upon and responds to the detection and 
punishment structure, but ,  unlike prior model s ,  we also expl icitly 
include the l aw enforcement agency -- in this case the Internal 
Revenue Service -- as an important interactive element. 
Initially we outline our general approach and its differences 
from the existing economic law enforcement paradigm, We then detail a 
simple model and its results and compare these resul ts both to the 
prior literature and to some of our ongoing research in an effort to 
il lustrate how our theoretical construct may affect predictions. 
Finally, we describe potential extensions of the model , examine its 
robustness with respect t o  various underlying assumptions and offer 
suggestions for further research , including possible applications to 
other l aw enforcement contexts, 
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1 .  INTRODUCTION 
Tax noncompliance is now widely recognized to be an extremely 
serious problem ; recent estimates suggest that at least $90 billion of 
taxable income goes unreported annually -- an average of 1 0  to 1 5  
percent o f  total taxable income . 1 Commissioner of Internal Revenue 
Roscoe Egger reported in 1 982 that the "income tax gap" in the legal 
, sector grew from $29 billion in 1 973 to $87 billion in 1 981 , and he 
projected a gap of $120 billion for 1 985 . 2 Shocking estimates are
also offered of income tax evasion in the illegal sector , 3 and some
observers regard declining compliance as posing a clear and present 
danger to the income tax. 4 
Concern about declining tax compliance has produced an 
outburst of government , tax bar , and academic analyses ,  but both the 
causes and the appropriate responses to the problem remain 
controversial. Tax noncompliance suggests a t  least three reasons for 
concer n .  First , revenue losses from noncompliance become particularly 
significant at a time of substantial budget deficits . Second , tax 
noncompliance may be creating a nation where citizens' disrespect for 
the tax laws will expand disrespect for other law s .  Third, compliance 
is desirable because fairness in taxation requires that equals should 
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pay equal taxes. 
Congress has responded to the perceived tax compliance crisis 
by enacting legislation in 1 981 , 1 982 , and 1 984 that provides new and 
increases penalties , expanded taxpayer information reporting 
requirements and novel procedures . Examples include penalties for 
substantial understatements of tax liabilities ( {6661 ) ,  for aiding and 
abetting understatements of tax liabilities ( {6701 ) ,  for the filing of 
frivolous returns ( {6702 ) ; for failure to supply taxpayer 
identi fication numbers ( {6676 ( a ) ) ,  for failure to file information 
returns ( {{6652 , 6678 , 66 86 ) , for extended failure to file tax returns 
( {6651 ) and for the promotion of abusive tax shelters ( {6700) . 
Criminal fines also were increased ( {{7201 , 7203 , 7205 ,  7206 , 7207) 
and additional information reporting was required ( {{6049 , 6 041 A,  
6678, 6 050E, 6053 ( c ) , 6706 , 6 708) . New requirements for registering 
tax shelters with the IRS and for maintaining lists of tax shelter 
investors were enacted ( {{6111 , 6112,  6 707 , 6 708)  and the IRS was 
given authority to seek injunctions agai nst the promoters of abusive 
tax shelters ( {6408) . Compliance measures were estimated to raise 
one-third of the total revenues to be raised by the 1 982 Tax Equity 
and Fiscal Responsibility Act , and additional compliance legislation 
seems virtually certain in 1986 . 
In adopting these measures, Congress explicitly embraced an 
economic approach to the noncompliance problem -- an approach that has 
seemed to dominate policy discussions, notwithstanding important 
contributions from a variety of other discipline s ,  including law , 
sociology and psychology. 5 The congressional committee reports on the
1982 Act , for example , describe the tax collection process as a "tax 
or audit lottery , " which presumes that citizens endeavor to maximize 
their own narrowly-perceived financial self-interests .  
Unfortunately, the existing paradigm for the economic analysis 
of tax compliance provides an inadequate theory of the revenue 
collection process .  Even as a purely economic model, its exclusive 
focus on individual taxpayers' decisionmaking promotes an unduly 
restrictive vision of the compliance problem and potential responses 
to i t .  A n  inadequate theoretical construct may both distort empirical 
analyses and imply unhelpful policy responses . 6 Our mission here is
to outline a more comprehensive theoretical basis for analyzing tax 
compliance . We believe our approach to be a significant improvement 
in the economic theory of law enforcement because it views the 
noncompliance problem as an interactive system . In our theoretical 
construct , individual decisionmaking not only depends upon and 
responds to the detection and punishment structure, but , unlike prior 
models , we also explicitly include the law enforcement agency -- in 
this case the Internal Revenue Service -- as an important interactive 
element . 
In the next section of this Article we outline our general 
approach and its differences from the existing economic law 
enforcement paradigm. We then detail a simple model and its results 
and compare these results both to the prior literature and to some of 
our ongoing research in an effort to illustrate how our theoretical 
construct may affect predictions. Finally , we describe potential 
extensions of the model, examine its robustness with respect to 
various underlying assumptions and offer suggestions for further 
research , including possible applications to other law enforcement 
contexts . 
2 .  THE NEED FOR AN INTERACTIVE THEORY 
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More than fifteen years ago, Gary s. Becker (196 8 )  established
the basic economics-of-crime methodology . Generally this approach 
treats criminal activity as a rational individual decision that 
depends upon probabili ties of detection and conviction and levels of 
punishment . Becker explicitly suggested that this methodology was 
applicable to tax evasion and avoidance ( Becker, pp. 170 and 172) and 
it frequently has been so applied . The classic treatment can be found 
in Allingham and Sandmo ( 1 972 ) , where the authors derive conditions 
under which an increase in the penalty rate or the probability of 
imposition of sanctions increases the reported taxable income of a 
rational maximizing taxpayer, who is subject to a proportional tax 
schedule and certain about both the penalty schedule and the 
probability of sanction imposition. 7 
Although the utilization of economic methodology in this 
context seems natural -- tax evasion, after all ,  is an economic crime 
-- most of the theoretical results to date do not seem particularly 
useful for either policy analysis or empirical study . The models 
consider only the actions of taxpayers and ignore those of others 
involved in the revenue collection process .  I n  particular, they fail 
to take into account the interrelationships between flexi ble IRS 
policy instruments and noncompliance ; in prior work, IRS actions and 
policies are treated as exogenous parameter s . 8 
5 
The exc lusive focus on taxpayer behavior of the dominant 
theoretical model means that individual-linked variables largely 
determine the outcomes.  Results, for example, are particularly 
sensitive to assumptions about individuals' attitudes toward risk. In 
addition, omitting the law enforc�ment agency from the theoretical 
paradigm makes it natural to ignore important legal, political and 
institutional factors that in some case s ,  enhance the IRS' s ability to 
enforce the tax laws and , in others, inhibit the government' s ability 
to apply what might otherwise seem to be theoretically desirable 
remedies . 9 
To be fai r ,  Becker' s primary inquiry was explicitly normative 
-- an effort to determine the "optimal" choice of punishment 
strategie s .  As h e  put it , his purpose was to answer the question "how 
many resources and how much punishment should be used to enforce 
different kinds of legislation" { Becker , p. 1 70 ) .  To answer this 
question, he needed a positive theory of criminal behavior , which he 
provided in the form of a rational utility-maximizing decisionmaker; 
this has become the most influential aspect of his analysis .  However, 
we contend that it is also necessary to integrate any positive 
description of individual behavior with a positive theory of the law 
enforcement agency to address properly the relevant policy issues. 1 0
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Our analysis of the tax compliance problem here introduces the­
IRS as a strategic actor in a game-theoretic approach that allows the 
IRS to condition its audit rules on the reports it receives from 
taxpayers. 11 Although we believe our methodology to be a significant
improvement in the economic theory of law enforcement generally ,  the 
behavioral framework of tax noncompliance makes it an especially 
appropriate case for a theoretical construct that explici tly takes 
into account the interactions and responses of the cognizant law 
enforcement agency . The tax law , unlike many other laws, requires the 
taxpayer to submit a report ,  or tax return, that directly conveys a 
significant amount of information to the law enforcement agency . The 
IRS has broad authority to demand that taxpayers supply information on 
tax returns under penalties of perjury and to adjust its audit and 
other detection programs in light of the reports that it receives. In 
addition, the IRS has great power to demand information relevant to 
the taxpayer ' s  tax liability from a variety of third parties . 1 2  The 
IRS also conducts a special series of intensive line-by-line audits of 
a randomly selected group of taxpayers { called the Taxpayer Compliance 
Measurement Program or TCMP) ; this progrli,lll demonstrates the extent to 
which careful audits will detect tax understatements { and 
overstatements ) and guides the allocation of IRS audit resources.13
It is a major weakness of the existing theoretical literature 
to ignore this central feature of the tax system -- a preliminary 
round of information transmission -- and to treat the IRS either as a 
completely exogenous element of the revenue collection process or , a t  
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best , as constrained to audit all taxpayers with the same frequency. 
In fac t ,  the IRS audit selection process clearly turns on the 
information it receives from taxpayers ,  and the evidence suggests that 
the IRS is more likely than taxpayers to act in a rational, optimizing 
manner. Thus , the revenue collections process is better seen as a 
"game" with levels of noncompliance , auditing and penalty assessment 
determined by the interaction between taxpayers and the IRS, 
Two of us have previously analyzed a so-called principal/agent 
model of income tax evasion in which the IRS is designated the 
principal and the taxpayer the agent (Reinganum and Wilde , 1 9 85 ) . 1 4
This formulation permits the IRS t o  adjust i t s  audit and enforcement 
strategy in light of the information contained in a taxpayer ' s  report , 
and thereby treats IRS behavior as endogenous to the model. The 
principal/agent model use d ,  however , requires the IRS to announce and 
commit to an audit policy before receiving taxpayers ' reports. This 
audit policy will typically prove suboptimal once taxpayers ' reports 
have been received; thus , the IRS will have incentives to deviate from 
its announced policy once the reports are submitted. Taxpayers will 
anticipate such deviations and will not believe (or be influenced by) 
the previously announced policy. In the game-theoretic approach 
employed here, we therefore restrict the set of strategies available 
to the IRS to eliminate such "empty threats . "  
The model described i n  the next section of this paper neither 
permits nor requires precommitment; instead , it follows the natural 
temporal sequence of decisions. First , the taxpayer reports h is or 
her income; then the IRS decides (on the basis of the taxpayer ' s  
reported income ) whether t o  perform an investigative audit. 1 5  If the
taxpayer is not audited , the taxpayer ' s  report determines his or her 
final tax liability; if the taxpayer is audited , his or her tax 
liability is computed on the basis of true income (which we assume to 
be discovered in the audit process ) , plus any applicable fine s ,  
penalties or interest . 
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Explicitly including the law enforcement agency in an economic 
analysis of noncompliance requires us to make specific assumptions 
about characteristics of the agency ' s  behavior in order to specify the 
actions that it will take in response to actions taken by individuals. 
Needless to say , any particular specification of an agency ' s  
preferences over such decisions is likely t o  b e  controversial and may 
have an important impact on the predictions of the theory. In our 
basic model, we assume that the IRS in its enforcement strategy 
attempts to maximize total government revenue , including taxes , 
interests and penaltie s ,  net of audit costs. We regard this as a 
reasonable assumption, and , to date at least , have found none other 
that we find more convincing , although we do not mean to suggest that 
others might not be equally reasonable or , perhaps, even better. 1 6
This question o f  t h e  IRS ' s  preferences is explored further i n  Part 5 ,  
below. 
A number of policymakers , including Commissioner Egger , seem 
to perceive the current noncompliance problem to be one of eroding 
ethics -- that more and more people are refusing to comply voluntarily 
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with the tax laws and instead are responding "strategically" to the 
enforcement structure of the income tax laws. Commissioner Egger 
believes that the propor tion of people who routinely and habitually 
comply with income tax rules is declining, perhaps at a rapid pace. 17 
In an effort to begin to analyze this problem, our model includes two 
types of taxpayers : ( 1) the "strategic noncompliers" -- the type of 
individuals posited by the standard eco nomics of crime literature,  who 
maximize results by weighing rationally the potential costs and 
benefits of understating tax liability; and ( 2) the "habitual 
compliers" -- individuals who endeavor to report taxable income 
correctly without regard either to the costs and benefits of playing 
the audi t lottery or to their perceptions about the compliance 
behavior of others. By developing a model that has the potential to 
consider the impact of such a variety of types of taxpayers, 18 we may 
eventually be able to distinguish among classes of taxpayers depending 
upon their relative opportunities to avoid taxes as well as thelr 
atti tudes. Habitual compliers , for example, may be thought of as 
persons who have little or no real opportunity not to comply, such as 
wage-earners in the legal sector without time to moonlight who do not 
itemize deductions. 
The model treats income levels , tax rates and fines as 
exogenous. This treatment of fines differs somewhat from their 
typical treatment in the economics of law enforcement literature, but 
follows naturally from our decision to use a model that treats the law 
enforcement agency as an endogenous interactive actor . The level of' 
1 0  
fines, after all, l s  typically se t by the legislative branch and, 
although the law enforcement agency may have considerable dlscretion 
in determining how to apply statutory penalties,  it will be 
constrained by the statutory requirements .  The statutory level of 
fines, as well as the necessary conditions for their application -­
for example , the requirement that the taxpayer ' s  tax understatement be 
determined to be willful in order to apply fraud penalties -- in turn 
may depend on a variety of legal, moral and political constraints. In 
contrast, the economics of crime literature standardly treats fines as 
a variable that can be adjusted to maximize a specified social welfare 
function and , principally because of the costs of detection, often 
yields the prediction that fines should be set at the maximum level 
with corresponding probabilities of detection at the minimum. ( One 
wag has described the resulting policy prescription as one that 
typically recommends hanging with probability zero. ) As the following 
discussion will make clear, our.treatment of the level of fines as an 
exogenous variable does not produce any difference in their impact on 
individual decisionmaking, nor does it eliminate potential tradeoffs 
between changes in the level of fines and probabilities of detecti on. 
Our model, however, does require us to address explicitly the question 
of how the exist ence and level of fines should be treated in 
describing both the preferences and the actions of the law enforcement 
agency. 
For mathematical tractability , in the model set forth here,  
income has one of two values , high or low. The IRS does not observe 
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true income : instead , it must rely initially on the report made by the 
taxpayer . The basic model assumes the IRS can audit as many taxpayers 
as it wants; initially we impose no budget constraint (but other of 
our work including budget constraints is discussed in Part 5 ) . 19
The model is considered to be solved when a so-called Nash 
equilibrium is reached , Such an equilibrium involves a probability of 
audi t ,  chosen by the IRS, and a probability of noncompliance , chosen 
by those taxpayers who act str ategically . A Nash equilibrium in this 
context is a pair of strategies by taxpayers and the IRS that are best 
responses to each other; at a Nash equilibrium , neither the IRS nor 
potential noncompliers have an incentive (unilaterally) to change 
their strategies . 20 The purpose of using such an equilibrium concept 
in a theoretical model -- such as th e use of the Nash equilibrium here 
is that it will be suggestive of directions and tendencies of the 
relevant parties ' responses in the context of a complex dynamic 
process .  I n  analyzing these responses ,  several seemingly counter-
intuitive results emerge -- for example, an increase in tax rates on 
high income is found to decrease noncompliance , 21 These results occur
largely because in our model the audit policy of the IRS is 
codetermined with the reporting behavior of potential noncompliers . 
The details of these results will be discussed in Parts 4 and'S below . 
3 .  A SIMPLE INTERACTIVE MODEL 
This section presents our formal model, translating the 
concepts discussed in the last section into mathematical terms, and 
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characterizing the equilibrium levels of auditin� and noncompliance 
that emerge from the interaction of the IRS and taxpayers . Our model 
is relatively simple as models go and we will endeavor to explain each 
step to the nontechnical reader as we proceed . A more concise 
presentation which presumes familiarity with the technical economics 
literature can be found in Graetz , Reinganum and Wilde ( 1 9 83 ) , 
Suppose that some taxpayers are "habitual compliers"; that is , 
they report their income truthfully regardless of their pecuniary 
interest . The remaining taxpayers act strategically , they examine 
their incentives carefully and act so as to maximize expected utility, 
taking as given the probability of audit associated with the income 
they choose to report. We denote the proportion of strategic 
taxpayers by p and the proportion of habitual compliers by 1 - p, 
where O p < 1 .
For simplicity , we assume there are only two income classes --
22 high and low, denoted IH and IL' respectively, where IL < IH' 
The 
IRS does not directly observe income; thus the taxpayers , regardless 
of their income, actually may report either high or low income. 23
Denote by TH and TL the individual tax payments owed by high­
and low-income taxpayers ,  respectively. We assume that TL i IL ' 
TH i IH and TL i TH . A taxpayer who is discovered to be 
underreporting income is fined in addition to being assessed the tax 
on high income; this fine is denoted by F, where F l o. We assume 
that the IRS treats as fixed tax levels and the fine for 
underreporting . 2 4
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Audi ting, of course , is costly to the IRS; we denote the cost 
of a single audit by c, where c l o. We further suppose that 
TH + F - TL > c ;  that i s ,  the increment to revenue associated with 
uncovering a noncomplier exceeds the audit cost , If this were not 
true , then even if noncompliers could be identified a priori , it would 
not pay to audit them and collect the additional taxes and fine s ,  We 
also assume that TL + F � IL and TH + F { IH; the sum of taxes plus 
fines cannot exceed a taxpayers incom e .  
W e  assume taxpayers who report truthfully are never fined, and 
suffer no other costs if they are audited ( this assumption can be 
relaxed; see Part S). Finally , q represents the probability that a 
randomly chosen taxpayer has high income , where O < q < 1 ,  Since each 
taxpayer is viewed as drawing high income with this probability ,  
auditing one taxpayer provides n o  information about the income of any 
other taxpayer . 25 With probability p the taxpayer is a strategic 
taxpayer, with probability 1 - p the taxpayer is a habitual complier 
and simply reports his or her income truthfully . 
A simple "game tree" ( Figure 1 )  describes the information and 
actions available to each player . The dotted lines in Figure 1 
represent so-called "information sets," Points in the game tree 
enclosed by the same information set are indistinguishable to the 
agen t  whose turn it is to make a decision at that stage . 
[ Figure 1 approximately here] 
Since we assume initially that taxpayers who report truthfully 
suffer no cost by being audited, taxpayers with low income will always 
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report truthfully . Thus a strategy for a strategic taxpayer is simply 
a probability of reporting low income when he or she actually has high 
income . We denote this probability by a. Any probability between 0 
and 1 is a feasible strategy for strategic taxpayers so the only 
constraint on their behavior is 0 { a � 1 .
Since the IRS cannot distinguish a pr,iori between compliers 
and noncompliers ( that i s ,  from a report of low income alone ) , in 
order to evaluate the benefits of auditing it must comput e the 
distribution of honest and dishonest taxpayers among those who report 
low income , Let µ(a) be the probability that a taxpayer who reports 
low income actually has high income, given that strategic taxpayers 
report low income when they really have high income with probability 
a. A routine statistical calculation known as Bayes ' rule implies 
11(a) pqa/[pqa + 1 - q] . ( 1 )  
Equation (1) has a simple explanation, Taxpayers report low income 
either when they really have low income ( this happens with probability 
1 - q) or when they have high income and lie ( this happens with 
probability pqa), 
A strategy for the IRS, meanwhile, is simply a probability of 
auditing a taxpayer who reports low income , since , in this model, it 
would have no reason to audit a taxpayer who reports high incom e .  We 
denote this probability by p. Agai n, any probability between 0 and 1 
is a feasible strategy for the IRS so the only constraint on IRS 
behavior is 0 � p � 1 .  Expected net revenue t o  the IRS when i t
1 5  
observes a report of low income , strategic taxpayers who observe high 
income report l ow with probabil ity a, and it audits low income reports
with probabil ity p can be written formally as
Tf (a,p) p [ µ ( TH + F - c )  + ( 1  - µ ) (TL - c ) ]  + ( 1  - p ) TL. 
The first term in this expression is the expected return from an 
audit , net of audit cost s ,  and the second term is the certain revenue 
received if no audit is performed . 
Let the taxpayers' utility function over certain income be 
denoted by U(•), Then the payoff to a strategic taxpayer who has high
incom e ,  in expected utility terms,  given he or she reports low income 
with probability a and is thereby audited with probability p is
U(a,p) 
The first term in this expression is the expected utility of reporting 
low income and the second term is the certain utility received if high 
income is reported . We assume the utility of certain income is 
incre asing in income but at a decreasing rate ( that is,  the marginal 
utility of certain income is falling -- taxpayers are risk averse ) .26
We also assume the IRS is risk-neutr al . 
A best response for the IRS to a given reporting rule used by 
potential noncompliers is a strategy which maximizes the IRS's net 
revenue , given that all the potential noncompliers use the speci fied 
reporting rul e .  Simil arly,  a best response for potential noncompliers 
to any given auditing rule is a strategy that maximizes expected 
util ity ,  given the specified audi ting rul e .  Final ly, a Nash 
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equilibrium is a pair of strategies that are best responses to each 
other; at a Nash equil ibrium neither the IRS nor potential 
noncompliers have an incentive to (unilaterally) change their 
strategies . 
Thus , in formal terms, a best response for the IRS to a given 
strategy a for potential noncompliers is a strategy �(a) such that
Tf(a,i(a)) l TT<a,p) for all other strategies p. Similarly ,  a best
response for potential noncompl iers to any given auditing policy P is 
A A 
a strategy a(p) such that U(a(p),p) l U(a,p) for al l other strategies
a. Final ly, a Nash equilibrium is a pair of strategies (a•,p•) such
that a•= �(p•) and p• =�(a•). 
For any given probability of noncompliance used by potential 
noncompliers, a, the IRS wants to choose its audit probability to
maximize its expected net revenue ; that is, it sets p to maximize
Tf(a,p), The marginal bene fit of auditing a taxpayer who reports low
income is 
( 2 )  
The marginal benefit o f  auditing a taxpayer who repor ts l ow 
income increases with ( a )  the conditional probability that the 
taxpayer has high income given that he or she reported low income, ( b )  
the tax owed by high-income taxpayers and ( c )  the fine. Since the 
conditional probability of high income given a report of low income 
increases with ( a )  the probabil ity that a strategic taxpayer reports 
low income when true income is high , ( b )  the proportion of strategic 
taxpayers rel a tive to all taxpayers and ( c )  the proportion of high-
income taxpayers relative to all taxpayers, the marginal benefit of 
auditing a taxpayer who reports low income also increases with these 
variables . The marginal benefit of auditing a taxpayer who reports 
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low income decreases with the tax owed by low-income taxpayers and the 
cost of audi t .  Notice , however , that it i s  independent of the 
likelihood of audit itsel f; that is, the benefits of auditing l ow 
income reports are linear in the audit probabil ity . 27 In fact , if the
conditional probability that the taxpayer has high income given that 
he or she reported l ow income (µ) is such that the marginal benefit of
auditing is positive, then it always pays to audit and if it is such 
that the marginal benefit of auditing is negative then it never pays 
to audi t .  Thus , if w e  define µ so that ( 2 )  i s  equal to zero --
µ = c/ ( TH + F - TL) -- then we can describe the IRS ' best response to
any specified reporting rul e ,  �(a), by
1 if µ(a) µ 
2 8  
[ 0, 1] if µ(a) = µ , 
0 if µ(a) < µ
where µ(a) is given by equation ( 1 ) . But we can say more: since
equation ( 1 )  describes how µ depends on a, we can substitute directly
from that expression to obtain 
{'. 
1 if a > a
t<a) [ 0,1]  if a = a , 
0 if a < a
1 8  
where 
a= ( 1  - q ) c/pq ( TH + F - TL - c ) . ( 3 )  
Here a > O unless the fine i s  infinite ( assuming that
0 < q < 1 and c > 0) , But we have assumed that F ! IH - TH; that is,
the IRS cannot take more than a person ' s  income . Thus th e IRS ' s  best 
response to the potential noncomplier' s strategy ( a  probabil i ty of 
nonoompliance ) is to audit if and only if the probabil ity of 
noncompliance is sufficiently high that it exceeds some trigger value 
a. This trigger value is strictly greater than 0; that is,  it is 
never a best response for the IRS to audit whenever the probability of 
noncompliance is positive . It is possible that a > 1 ,  however, so 
that it might never pay the IRS to audit ( e . g . , if the cost of audit 
is high enough ) .  
For a given probability of audit ,  �. the strategic taxpayer 
wishes to choose a probabil ity of noncompliance so as to maximize his 
or her expected utility of net income; that is, he or she sets a to 
maximize U(a . � ) . The marginal gain to reporting low income when a 
taxpayer actually has high income -- that is, the marginal benefit of 
noncompliance -- is 
This gain decreases with ( a )  the probabil ity of audit ,  ( b )  the 
fine , and ( c )  the tax owed by low-income taxpayers. The dependence of 
this gain on the tax owed by high-income taxpayers is ambiguous in 
1 9  
general . This is because increasing the tax owed by high-income 
taxpayers not only increases the gain from noncompliance when the 
taxpayer is not audited but also increases the loss from noncompliance 
when the taxpayer is apprehended and punished . For risk-neutral 
taxpayer s ,  the marginal benefit of noncompliance increases with the 
amount of tax owed by high-income taxpayers . More important, however , 
is the fact that the marginal benefit of noncompl iance is independent 
of the likelihood of noncompliance itself; that is, the benefits of 
noncompliance are linear in the probability of noncomplianoe . 2 9  Thus , 
the potential nonoomplier will always comply if the probability of 
audit {p) is such that the marginal benefits of noncompliance are 
negative and never comply if it is such that the marginal benefits of 
noncompliance are positive . Hence , if we define ii so that ( 4 )  is equal 
to z ero, that i s ,  
then w e  can describe the taxpayer's best response t o  any specified 
audit rul e ,  �{p), by 
�(p) 
1 if p p 
[ 0, 1] if p = p 
o ifP> ii
3 0  
( 5 )  
I t  is easy to show that 0 < ii < 1 .  Thus the potential noncomplier's 
best response to the IRS' strategy (a probability of audit ) is to 
comply if and only if the probability of audit is sufficiently hi.gh 
that it exceeds some trigger value ii. This trigger value lies 
20 
strictly between O and 1;  that is, it is not necessary to audit every 
low income return to induce compliance . 
Given the two best response functions j{a) and �(p) we are in 
a position to calculate equilibrium configurations. If we think in 
terms of graphs ,  each of these best response functions defines a curve 
in two-dimensional space (one dimension representing a and the other 
representing p), The equil ibrium is given where these curves 
intersect. Since both best response functions t ake the value 0 or 1 
except at their respective trigger values (a and ii>. the equilibrium 
strategies will equal those trigger values so l ong as both are between 
O and 1 ,  It ' s  always the case that 0 < ii < 1 ,  but it might be that 
a > 1 .  Thus combining the best response functions gives two possible
equilibrium configurations. In the first configuration, illustrated 
in Figure 2 ,  all strategic taxpayers underreport but there is no 
auditing; that i s ,  {a•,p•) = ( 1 , 0) , In this case , it is not worth 
auditing any individual who reports low income even if al l strategic 
taxpayers are known to be underreporting, because the IRS still cannot 
tell ( without auditing) whether an individual who reports low income 
is reporting truthfully ( th at i s ,  is a habitual complier with low 
income ) or untruthfully {th at is, is a strategic taxpayer with high 
income ) ,  This situation, which occurs when the trigger value a 
exceeds 1 ,  arises for any of several reasons; for example ,  audit costs 
may be high , the proportion of strategic taxpayers may be l ow ,  or the 
proportion of low-income taxpayers may be high , 3 1
[Figure 2 approximately here] 
In the second configuration auditing sometimes pays : a < 1.
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In equil ibrium ,  some strategic taxpayers with high income actually do 
underreport, and some taxpayers who report low income actually are 
audited; in particular , (a•,p•) =(a,�) .  This case is illustrated in
Figure 3 .  
[Figure 3 approximately here] 
The next section of this paper wil l discuss the implications 
of this basic model , focussing on how changes in underlying parameters 
effect a and p, assuming both are between O and 1 .  Part 5 then will
discuss various extensions and modifications of the basic model . 
4 .  RF.SUL TS 
As we have indicated, the purpose of the preceding formal 
model is to il lustrate , in a rel atively simple framework, some of the 
affects of introducing the IRS as a strategic actor in the compliance 
game. The sort of "results" typically yielded by economic models of 
tax compliance take the form of comparative statics; that is, they 
consist of predictions concerning the effects of changing underlying 
parameters such as tax rates or the cost of audits on thll equilibrium 
values of the choice variables of the model . In the classic economic 
model of tax compliance the principal choice variable is the extent of 
underreporting . 3 2  In our interactive framework the choice variables
are the probability of underreporting, a, and the probability of
audit ,  p ( th e  former given the taxpayer acts strategically and has 
high income and the latter given a report of low income has been 
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received by the IRS ) .  Two related variables are the probability that 
a randomly drawn taxpayer will be a noncompl ier (denoted PN and given
by PN = qp�) and the probabil ity that a randomly drawn report wil l be
audited (denoted PA and given by PA= p(qpa + 1 - q ) ) .
33 The latter
two variables represent aggregate noncompliance and aggregate 
auditing , respectively. Table 1 summarizes the effects of changes in 
the underlying parameters on these four variabl es .  Some of the 
effects may initially seem counter-intuitive primarily because they 
depend upon equilibrium interactions between the taxpayer and the IRS. 
The discussion following Table 1 describes the results, offers
intuitive explanations for them, and compares them to those found in 
the existing l iterature (where applicabl e ) . 
[Table 1 approximately here] 
In interpreting our results , the reader should keep in mind 
that, even though we have presented our model here as if it were a 
global representation of the noncompliance probl em , the model might 
also be viewed as addressing issues of noncompliance across a 
relatively small range of income -- for example ,  within a given audit 
class. As our subsequent discussion in Part 5 of extensions and 
modifications of the model suggests,  this basic model may well have 
advantages over more mathemati cal ly complex models for analyzing this 
important set of issues . 
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4 . 1  Fines 
We begin with the effects of increases in the fine for 
noncompliance since , although our methodology is different,34 these
results agree with those found in the existing literature. As in the 
standard economics of crime and tax evasion literature, an increase in 
the fine for underreporting reduces both the likelihood that a 
potential noncomplier actually fails to comply and aggregate 
noncompliance , In our model , however , an increase in the fine also 
resul ts in less auditing, both of individual low income reports and in 
the aggregate. The direct impact of an increase in the fine is to 
increase the marginal benefit of auditing , but it also increases the 
marginal cost of noncompliance so that strategic taxpayers respond by 
increasing their compliance rate, This allows the IRS.to reduce the 
probability of audit in the new equil ibrium. But driving equilibrium 
noncompliance ( and the equilibrium probability of audit )  to zero would 
require an infinite fine . 
4 . 2  Audit Costs 
The existing l iterature has littl e  to say about the effects of 
changes in audit costs on noncompl iance because the probability of 
audit is generally taken as given. In our model , an increase in audit 
costs results in an increase in both individual and aggrega te 
noncompliance , It has no effect on the probability of audit for an 
individual who reports l ow income, but it increases the aggregate 
number of audi t s .  
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To understand why this must be so, suppose there is an 
exogenous increase in audit costs . If potential noncompliers made no 
adjustment in their behavior then it would no longer pay the IRS to 
audit as often . But then potential noncompliers would have an 
incentive to underreport mor e frequently,  which in turn would cause 
the IRS to increase its audit rate. In the new equilibrium there must 
be no incentive for either the IRS or taxpayers to make further 
adjustments of this sort.  This happens when potential noncompliers 
increase the probability of underreporting just enough to compensate 
the IRS for the increase in audit costs by making the average audit 
more productive ( in terms of discovering actual noncompliers and 
collecting more taxes and fines ) .  Hence individual noncompliance and 
aggregate noncompliance increase . This increase in noncompliance 
perfectly offsets the increase in audit costs,  so that the probabil ity 
of audit for a taxpayer who reports low income is unaffected in 
equili brium . In spite of this,  because th e aggregate number of l ow 
income reports increases and because each of these taxpayers is 
audited with an unchanged probability, the aggregate number of audits 
increases.  
4 . 3  The Distribution of Income 
Recall that q is the probabil ity that a random taxpayer has 
high incom e .  A n  increase in this probability thus reflects a n  upward 
shift in the distribution of income. In such a case , it wil l be less 
likely that a given taxpayer who reports low income actual l y  is a low 
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income individual, so that the IRS will have a greater incentive to 
audi t .  Thus , i n  the new equilibrium, each strategic taxpayer will 
respond to an upward shift in the distribution of in9ome by decreasing 
his or her probability of noncompliance , thereby compe nsating the IRS 
for the increase in the marginal benefit of auditing. Again ,  as with 
changes in audit costs ,  the probability of audit among those who 
report low income is unaffected in the new equilibrium so 
noncompliance and the probability of audit decrease in the aggregate. 
4 . 4 Tax Rates 
An important class of results involves changes in the level of 
taxes . First , consider an increase in the tax on high income 
i ndividuals . This is analogous to an increase in the progressivity of 
the tax rate schedule since the tax on low income is unchanged .  ( In 
Part 5 we assume taxes are proportional to income and consider the 
effects of changes in the tax rate ) . An increase in the tax on high 
income increases the marginal gain to underreporting, but also 
i ncreases the marginal gain to auditing. The latter effect dominates, 
so in the new equilibrium both individual and aggregate noncompliance 
fa11. 3 5  A n  increase i n  the tax on high income can either increase or 
decrease audit rates, depending on the risk preferences of 
taxpayers. 3 6  Generally speaking, increases in the tax on low income 
have opposite effects to those stemming from increases in the tax on 
high income . 3 7
4 . 5  The Percentage of Strategic Noncompliers 
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As indicated previously, the belief that deteriorating ethics 
is in part responsible for increases in noncompliance makes th e 
effects of changes in the proportion of strategic taxpayers in th e 
population particularly interesti ng . 3 8  The reason for such a change 
does not matter in our model. The propor tion of strategic 
noncompliers might increase , for example, either because of a change 
in taxpayer attitudes or because , even without a change in underlying 
attitudes,  the structure of penalties and IRS enforcement policies now 
makes it more profitable for increased numbers of people not to 
comply . Of course , many people may have always acted strategically ;  
w e  may simply have become better able t o  measure the extent of such 
behavior . 
In any event, in our model, an increase in the percentage of 
strategic taxpayers has only one effect: to reduce the likelihood 
that any strategic taxpayer with high income fails to report honestly. 
This results because with more potential noncompliers (more taxpayers 
who may falsely report low income ) ,  a report of low income is 
correspondingly more likely to have come from a strategic taxpayer who 
has failed to comply than from a habitual complier with low income. 
Thus , although there are more potential noncompliers, in the new 
equilibrium each is more likely to comply , and these effects exactly 
cancel out so that the aggregate number of taxpayers who fail to 
comply is unaffected . Similarly , both the probability of audit for an 
individual who reports low income, and the aggregate probability of 
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audit are unchanged ,  levels, and alternative IRS objective functi ons. 
In addition to having no effect on either auditing or tho 
aggregate level of noncompliance , changes in the percentage of 5 . 1  Proportional Taxation and Fines 
strategic taxpayers also have no effect on expected revenue . 3 9  This In our basic model we allow tax levels and fines to take 
observation yields a provocative conclusion: an exogenous increase in 
the proportion of strategic taxpayers has no impact on aggregate 
expected revenues or aggregate compliance , and should consequently 
have no affect on aggregate auditing policy . Not only is no change in 
audi t policy warranted to correct for the increase in strategic 
behavior, but also , as long as a sufficiently large fraction of 
taxpayers behaves strategically, 4 0 increases in the proportion of
strategic taxpayers do not account for declining compliance and tax 
revenues.41
5 ,  EX TENSIONS AND MODIFICATIONS OF THE BASIC MODEL 
The discussion of our model's predictions in Part 4 shows 
clearly that models of tax compliance that include the IRS as a 
strategic actor can yield results both distinct from and richer than 
models that include only the taxpayer. The model we have delineated 
to make this point is,  by design, very simple. It nevertheless yields 
a number of interesting results ; therefore, it becomes useful to ask 
how robust are these results to various extensions or modifications of 
the basic model. In this section we summarize the effects of 
introducing into the model proportional taxation and fines, taxpayer 
audit costs ,  IRS budget constraints, more than two taxpayer income 
relatively arbitrary values ( i n  particular, we require only that 
TL i TH) ,  A special case often considered in the literature assumes
that taxes are proportional to income . Let the tax rate be denoted by 
t, where 0 < t < 1 .  We then have TH = tIH and TL = tIL' Further,
since penalties for underreporting are generally proportional to 
evaded tax , we can assume F = nt ( IH - IL) where n is the penalty rate 
on evaded tax , n l 0, If these expressions for tax levels and the
fine are substituted into the equilibrium values for the probability 
of noncompliance and probability of audit of Part 3 ,  we get ,  
respectively, 
( 6) 
and 
( 7 )  
Table 2 summarizes how changes i n  the tax rate, the penalty 
rate and the difference between high and low income affect individual 
noncompliance and audit levels (a and j respectively) and aggregate 
noncompliance and audit levels ( PN and PA respectively ) , 
[Table 2 approximately here] 
An increase in the penalty rate decreases equilibrium 
noncompliance and equilibrium auditing, both at the individual and the 
Z9 
aggregate level. This is consistent with the general resul ts 
summarized in Table 1 and follows from the same logic given in the 
discussion of fines following that tabl e .  Simil arly, the model shows 
that increases in the tax rate, like increases in the degree of 
progressivity, decrease individual and aggregate noncompliance. The 
popular press and many government and academic commentators often 
as sume the opposite, and partial equilibrium models are generally 
ambiguous on this matter; in the standard model s, whether an increase 
in the tax rate increases or decreases noncompliance depends largely 
on the risk preferences of taxpayers . 42
In our model, equilibrium compliance is enhanced by an 
increase in the tax rate, regardl ess of the risk preferences of 
taxpayers .  The intuition behind this result is the same as that which 
expl ains why increases in the degree of progressivity increase 
equil i brium compliance both the incentive to underreport and the 
incentive to audit increase, and the l atter dominates in equilibrium . 
A similar analysis explains why equilibrium compliance increases with 
income inequality, as measured by the difference between the high and 
low income level s .  I n  general, the dependence of audit probabil ities, 
both at the l evel of an individual l ow income report <i> and at the 
aggregate l evel ( PA ) ,  upon the tax rate and the extent of income 
inequality are ambiguous . 43 
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5.2 Taxpayer Audit Costs 
We have heretofore assumed that audits are costless to 
taxpayers, but an audit can be both costly and time-consuming even if 
the taxpayer has reported honestly and can demonstrate the accuracy of 
his or her report. Suppose that al l taxpayers suffer a cost of k when 
audited , The net expected revenue generated by an audit is unaffected 
since taxpayer audit costs can be regarded as a deadweight loss rather 
than a transfer to the government . 44 Thus it is clear that it stil l 
never pays the IRS to audit individual s who report high income. 
However, if, for example, taxpayer audit costs are large or the 
difference in taxes is small, l ow-income taxpayers might prefer to 
report high income in order to to avoid taxpayer audit costs. 
Analysis of this amended model yields the following results 
( assuming the marginal utility of certain income does not fal l too 
rapidly -- for details, see Graetz, Rei nganum and Wilde, 1 983 ) . In 
equilibrium , all low income taxpayers still report low income, and 
high income strategic taxpayers use the same strategy as when taxpayer 
audit costs are zer o . 4 5  The IRS ' s  equil ibrium audit probability for 
individual low income reports becomes l ess than the equil ibrium audit 
probability for individual l ow income reports when taxpayer audit 
costs are zero. 46 
Thus, taxpayer audit costs h ave no effect on equil i brium 
noncompliance ; no low income taxpayer elects to overreport and the 
same fraction of high income strategic taxpayers elect to underreport.  
The easiest way to see why no l ow-income taxpayers overreport is to 
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recognize th at all taxpayers must pay the taxpayer audit cost if they 
are actually audited , Assume, then, that low income strategic 
taxpayers report high income in order to avoid the risk of incurring 
these costs , paying unnecessary taxes ( TH - TL) to do so. Generally 
thi s  implies that a high-income strategic taxpayer wil l not risk 
payi ng the taxpayer audit cost plus the fine for underreporting to 
save an identical amount in taxes ; he or she would also prefer to 
report high income , But then it would never pay to audit,  and in such 
circumstances , all strategic taxpayers would report low income , So, 
it must be the case that in equilibrium all l ow-income strategic 
taxpayers report honestly, Hence the existence of positive taxpayer 
audit costs affects only the equil ibrium audit probabil ity, which is 
reduced; the same l evel of noncompliance is sustained with a lower 
level of auditing, 
Taxpayer audit costs may depend to some extent upon the 
compl exity of tax l aws . If an increase in taxpayer audit costs is due 
to i ncreased complexity, however, it is also likely to be accompanied 
by an increase in the IRS's audit cost s .  Thus a n  increase i n  the 
complexity of the law can resul t in both more noncompliance (because 
of the increase in the IRS ' s  audit cost s )  and a l ower probability of 
audit for each taxpayer who reports l ow income ( because of the 
increase in taxpayer audit costs ) .  However, since the number of low 
income reports is increased ,  the net effect on the aggregate number of 
audi ts is ambiguous. 
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5 , 3  Budget Constraints 
All formal models make simplifying assumptions and our basic 
model is no different from others in this regard , It is, however, 
important to understand to what extent any model , especially one that 
may have implications for public policy decisions, is sensitive to 
these kind of assumptions. Two of the most crucial simpl ifying 
assumptions in our basic model are that income only takes one of two 
values and th at the IRS faces no budget constraint. We have examined 
the effects of relaxing both of these assumptions and the results of 
those analyses appear to be closely rel ated , The effects of a binding 
budget constraint seem now , as a formal matter, to depend on whether 
income can take more than two values.  In this subsection we discuss 
the effects of imposing a budget constraint on the model , while 
maintaining the hypothesis of only two income l evels ( and , impli citly, 
only two possible level s of reported income ) , In the next subsection 
we discuss the effects of introducing a range of possible income 
levels,  both without and with a budget constrai nt. 
In the equilibrium of our basic model , the IRS would like to 
audit, on average , � percent of al l low income reports . But a budget 
constraint may limit the IRS to auditing some fraction of all 
taxpayers, say A. If A < p, the IRS sometimes might wish to audit 
more taxpayers than it can. In other words , for the budge t constraint 
not to bind , the budget must be l arge enough that the IRS can afford 
to audit every taxpayer with probability � ( it is potentially the case 
that all taxpayers report l ow income, so to eliminate any effects due 
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to a budget constraint , the IRS must be able i n  principle to audit 
them all with the desired probability ji), An analysis of optimal 
auditing and reporting strategies in this case quickly becomes 
complicate d .  We have performed this task elsewhere ( Graetz , Reinganum 
and Wilde,  1 98 4 )  and will only summarize the results in this paper. 
Consider first the taxpayer side of th e problem . A binding 
budget constraint may dramatically affect taxpayer behavior . If the 
IRS faces a binding budget constrai nt , the probability that any 
individual taxpayer will be audited depends on the behavior of other 
taxpayer s ;  the odds that any individual taxpayer will be audited are 
much lower if everyone with high income reports low income than if 
everyone reports honestly. Thus, if one looks only at the taxpayer 
side of the problem , IRS budget constraints produce "congestion" that 
leads to the existence of multiple equilibrium reporting strategies 
whenever the budget is neither too high nor too low . In one of these 
equilibria no strategic taxpayer ever complies and in the other they 
always comply . This congestion feature of the compliance problem 
largely has been ignored in the crime and punishment literature 
generally and appears nowhere in the literature on tax compliance. 47 
Some authors do consider the effects of budget constrai nts ( e . g . ,  
Greenberg , 1 98 4 ) , but none explicitly model the strategic interaction 
between taxpayers, so that this congestion effect never arises .  Some 
surveys report that noncompliance is more likely as a taxpayer knows 
more taxpayers who have failed to comply ( Spicer and Lundsted t ,  1 976;  
Song and Yarbrough , 1 97 8 ) , but usually offer psychological or 
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sociological, not eco nomic, explanations for this phenomenon . 
Of course the taxpayers' response to audit rules is only part 
of the story . Since universal compliance eliminates audi ting it can 
never be part of a "full equilibrium . "  In fact , in the simple 
framework of our model, the addition of the IRS as a strategic actor 
generally produces a unique equilibrium and a binding constraint on 
the IRS budget typically leads to total noncompliance (by strategic 
taxpayers with high income ) .  When the budget constraint does not 
bind , of course , the equilibrium is as described in Part 3 of this 
paper . 
That the introduction of a binding budget constrai nt into our 
basic model generally implies total noncompliance by strategic 
taxpayers is a. disturbing result. The reason for this result is, 
however , clear; as we discussed in Part 3 ,  whether a strategic 
taxpayer with high income complies depends on whether the audit 
probability is greater than or equal to a trigger value <ii>. If the
presence of a budget constraint means the IRS cannot attain this level 
of audi ting , then no strategic taxpayer will ever report high income,  
In such an equilibrium, changes in other parameters cannot effect 
behavior unless they result in lowering the trigger value s ufficiently 
to make the budget constraint nonbinding. 
Several points need to be made regarding this result . The 
first , and most important, is that it now appears largely to be an 
artifact of the assumption that income is restricted to one of two 
levels . This assumption reduces the compliance problem simply to a 
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comply/don' t comply choice that is extremely sensitive t o  the 
probability of audit .  Two o f  us have examined a related model th at 
assumes income is randomly distributed on some range of values 
( Rei nganum and Wilde, 1 984) . The analysis of that model is extremely 
technical ( and certain other simplifying assumptions have to be 
introduced )  but , although this is surely not the last word, the 
qualitative results there are relatively insensitive to the presence 
of a binding budget constrai nt , and in other respects are similar to 
the results discussed in this paper.4 8
A second , and related point, concerns the assumption implicit 
in a budget-constraint model that the budget constraint applies 
separately to IRS audit activity. The IRS ,  in fact, has the 
capability of shifting resources among a variety of administrative and 
enforcement activities. When such shifts are possible, there may , in 
terms of qualitative effects ,  be no binding budget constraint, 49 In 
other words , the qualitative effects s ummarized in Table 1 will 
continue to hold . When, as we suggested earlier, the results of the 
basic model are regarded as applying within a relatively small range 
of i ncome -- for example, within a single audit class or category of 
taxpayer, such as large corporations -- an identical point may be made 
about the lack of a binding budget constrai nt in analyzing that aspect 
of the noncompliance problem , 
Finally, even if there were a separate budget constraint on 
audit activity , our simple model will still be useful in evaluating 
how various changes in the underlying parameters affect whether the 
budget constraint i s ,  in fact , binding . Until we know how much the 
IRS should want to audit ,  we cannot tell whether its budget prevents 
i t  from auditing that much , This is not merely a matter of the size 
of the budget;  the constrai nt binds whenever the IRS is unable to 
audit all of the taxpayers it might want to audi t .  For example, i f  
taxpayers are indifferent to risk, our model implies the IRS should 
want to audit the fraction P = ( TH - TL) / ( TH - TL + F) of those 
taxpayers who report low income . Thus , in this case , th e budget 
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constraint binds whenever A < (TH - TL) / ( TH - TL + F ) , where A i s
again the percentage o f  the total number o f  taxpayers which the IRS 
can afford to audit.  Thus the budget constraint is more likely to 
bind when the budget is small, the cost per audi t is high , the fine is 
low, or the difference between the taxes owed by a high-income and a 
low-income taxpayer is large. 
5 . 4  More Than Two Income Levels 
Perhaps the strongest assumption of our basic model is that 
taxpayers' true incomes must take one of only two values.  This 
greatly simplifies the analysis by reducing the compliance problem to 
a simple comply/don't comply decision. Reinganum and Wilde ( 1 984 ) 
analyze an interactive model of tax compliance in which income can 
take any value in some range . In such a case taxpayers must decide 
both whether and how much to underreport based on their true income 
and the IRS's audit policy . The latter consists of a probability of 
audit for each reported level of income.  The primary analysis in that 
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paper seeks t o  characterize the form of taxpayers' equilibrium 
reporting rul es and the IRS's equilibrium audi t rule ,  That anal ysis 
is mathematically very complex and extremely technical , but under some 
plausible assumptions, it shows th at, in one equilibrium , at least,  
within a given audit class, the audit rule is decreasing in the l evel 
of reported income and the reporting rul e is such that al l taxpayers 
underreport, but by an amount which is decreasing in true income . 
As suggested previously , the effects of introducing a binding 
budget constraint on this model are quite different than in the 
simpler two-income model , If a binding budget constraint is 
introduced , the audit rate falls for each l evel of reported income and 
the extent of underreporting increases ,  but the basic qualitative 
properties of the model remain intact . The reason for this is that 
with a range of possible true incomes ,  taxpayers can choose a level of 
noncompliance , not j ust whether to comply.  If the IRS is co nstrained 
to audit l ess often than it would l ike , compliance levels will fal l ,  
but not s o  drastically as in the two-income model . 
S . S  Other IRS Ob 1ective Functions 
As we discussed in Part 2 of this Article ,  introducing the law 
enforcement agency into models of tax compliance requires us to 
specify in formal terms both the actions available to the IRS and the 
nature of its preferences with respect to those actions. In our baslc 
model , the actions avail able to the IRS are probabilities of audi t ,  
and w e  charact erize their preferences with respect t o  different 
probabil ities of audit in terms of expected total revenue ( the 
aggregate of taxes col lected plus penalties and fines ) ne t of the 
costs of audit ,  This seems a natural starting point, but al ternative 
candidates for IRS objective functions certainly exist . 
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To il lustrate the impact of choosing a different IRS obj ective 
function, suppose , for example ,  that the IRS is interested in 
maximizing only the amount of understated income discovered by the 
audit process (again net of audit cost s ) ;  that is, it does not take 
into account fines or taxes or any income reported by those taxpayers 
who are not audited. so The expected benefit from auditing a low 
income report is now the sum of the probabil ity of detecting 
noncompliance times the di fference between high and low income,  minus 
the cost of the audit. 51
When this new objective function is used , the equil ibrium 
l evel of auditing is unchanged ,  but both individual and aggregate 
noncompliance under the new obj�ctive function increase or decrease as 
the difference between high and low income ( IH - IL ) is less than or 
greater than the sum of the additional tax collected plus the fine 
( TH + F - TL) .
52 In fact , there exists a critical level of the fine 
such that with the new objective function there wil l be l es s  
noncompliance for any fine less than the critical value and more 
noncompliance for any finer greater than the critical value. 53
However, the qualitative properties of the new equil ibrium wil l be the 
same as in our basic model , except that noncompliance now depends on 
the difference in income between the high-income and l ow-income 
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taxpayers rather than the difference i n  tax levels and i s  independent 
of th e fine, 54
As this brief discussion of one alternative IRS objective 
function suggests,  specifying the IRS ' s  decisionmaking rule may have a 
substantial effect on the predi ctions of an interactive model such as 
ours . By general ly ignoring the law enforcement agency as an actor in 
the compliance proces s ,  this controversial task is avoided in the 
standard economics-of-crime literature. 
We believe that the revenue-maximizing objective function used 
in our basic model adequately captures both the general and the 
specific deterrence objectives often attributed to IRS enforcement 
policy. Many anecdotal descriptions of IRS behavior -- such as 
identifying and counting the corporate jets at the Superbowl 01• 
Kentucky Derby or publicizing tax fraud indictments just before the 
the April 1 5  tax return filing deadline may fit generally with such 
a revenue maximization objective function. It may well be the case 
that the IRS would place greater weight on maximizing tax collections 
than on fines, but we have not yet been able to agree on a weighing 
that we consider clearly superior to total revenue maximization. In 
any event, refining and defending descriptions of the objectives and 
behavior of the relevant law enforcement agency should be an important 
continuing aspect of tax compliance research , as well as of 
applications of interactive models such as ours to other law 
enforcement contexts . 
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6. CONCLUSION 
This article has attempted to illustrate that the introduction 
of the law enforcement agency into a game-theoretic analysis of tax 
compliance offers considerable opportunity for insights and 
predictions that are simply not possi ble in the standard eco nomic 
analysis of law enforcement . Relationships that have previously been 
ignored in the economic literature become clarified by a formal model 
that explicitly integrates taxpayers and the IRS. Considering the 
effects on both sides of many important elements of the tax compliance 
problem for example, of legal complexity , potentially declining 
ethics , and changes in the tax rate or its progressivity -- often 
implies very different conclusions than would emerge from looking only 
at the taxpayer side of the compliance problem . In addition, the way 
in which the law enforcement agency agency takes the relevant legal 
structure into account -- for example , how fines and penalties enter 
into its objective function -- demonstrates explicitly the role of 
agency behavior and preferences in addressing the compliance problem . 
Moreover, the game-theoretic approach described here makes it possible 
to consider the existence of and interactions among a variety of types 
of taxpayers, who may have differing attitudes or opportunities for 
noncompliance . In the tax compliance context at least,  where the law 
enforcement agency is known to alter its behavior in light of 
taxpayers ' reports , we believe our theoretical construct t o  be a major 
improvement . 
The theoretical approach offered here also presents numerous 
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opportunities for further refinement and extensions. For example, 
variations in the flow of informati on between taxpayers and the law 
enforcement agency may have a significant impact on the resul ts of our 
mode l s .  I n  addition, it should b e  possible t o  introduce important 
third parties into the analysis;  in the tax compliance context, for 
example, the role of attorneys, accountants and tax return preparers 
merits exploration. S S
Other legal contexts offer opportunities for further 
exploration of theoretical model s along the lines we have describe d ,  
Many regulatory contexts require initial reporting b y  the entity that 
is being monitored; some important examples include securities 
regulation, employment discrimination regulation, food and drug 
regu lation and e nvironmental regulation, In addition, the 
administration of many government expenditures, including public 
welfare and transfer programs, begin with the submission of a claim 
for relief. Thus , our approach might provide insights into the 
administration of programs such as those i nvolving public wel fare, 
unemployment compensation and disability insurance . 
Moreover, the inclusion of the law enforcement agency as an 
interactive participant in a formal model of compliance suggests 
numerous possibilities for analyzing important legal institutions. In 
addition to government agencies, such as the IRS and the other 
regul atory and administrative bodies listed above, a variety of actors 
have significant functions, coupled with considerable discretion, in 
implementing the mandates of law; prosecutors and juries are but two 
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important examples. Interactive law enforcement model s ,  such as that 
offered here, should have considerable advantages in expl oring the 
impact on predicted behavior of the differing goals and information of 
the members of such institutions. 
Finally, it seems necessary to subj ect our approach to 
empirical testing. S6 To date, the rather sparse empirical work on tax
compliance considers the important variables on the law enforcement 
side, such as the probability of audit, to be exogenous, rather than 
endogenously determined based upon the level of noncompliance. To the 
extent that these empirical studies take into account IRS responses 
such as establishing a "Discriminent Index Function" for selecting 
returns for audit or determining the volume of notices sent to 
taxpayers, our theoretical work suggests that interrelationships 
( technically, a simul tanei ty problem) might affect empirical 
resul ts.  s7 
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1 .  Henry ( 19 83 )  provides a good summary and critique of the 
techniques used to derive these estimates . 
2 ,  Compliance Gap: Hearings before th e Subcommittee on Oversight of 
the Committee on Finance , 97th Congress ,  2d session ( 1 9 82 ) .  
3 .  See Henry , supra, note 1 .  
4 ,  See , for exampl e,  Vitez ( 1 9 83 )  at p ,  1 91 ,  who r emarks that "tho 
dramatic deterioration in oompliance levels witnessed thus far, 
if not reversed quickly and forcefully, will gain further 
momentum and eventual ly erode , beyond repair, the integrity of 
our present income tax syst em . " 
5 .  Recent surveys of this literature can be found in Witte and 
Woodbury ( 1983 ) and Cowell ( 1 9 85 ) . 
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6 .  See Graetz and Wilde ( 1 9 85 ) . 
7 .  Witte and Woodbury ( 1983 )  have reviewed various extensions and 
refinements in the tax compliance context of Allingham and 
Sandmo ' s  application of Becker's general model . ( See, for 
exampl e ,  Srinivasan, 1 97 3 ,  Yitzhaki , 1 97 4 ,  or Fishburn, 1 981 . )  
Some other authors working in the Becker framework have related 
the compliance problem to labor supply decisions, and have 
discussed such questions as the extent to which individuals might 
shift their labor supply from primary markets, where wage income 
is reported and taxed, to secondary or "underground" markets , 
where wage income is not reported . ( For example ,  see Andersen, 
1 97 7 ;  Pencavel , 1 97 9 ;  and Sandmo, 1 981 ) .  
8 ,  Al though some empirical work baaed on Becker's model , in contexts
other than tax law, has taken interrelationships between 
criminals and l aw enforcement agencies into account,  the various 
theoretical extensions of his model have not ( see Pyl e ,  1 983 , for 
an excel lent summary of the empirical wor k ) . There have been a 
number of papers in the economics of crime literature which 
analyze the optimal penalty system using a util itarian criterion 
( Becker , 1 96 8 ;  Stigl er , 1 970; Brown and Reynolds , 1 97 3 ;  Stern, 
1 97 5 ;  Polinsky and Shavell ,  1 97 9 ) , While these papers 
incorporate a kind of equilibrium approach , they are nei ther game 
theoretic nor do they permit the probability of detection of 
noncompliance to be sensitive to the actions of the taxpayers ( i n  
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particular , to reported levels of income ) .  In one apparent 
exception to this, Hoeflich ( 19 83 )  labels his analysis of the tax 
compliance problem "game-theoretic, " but fails to use any game­
theor etic methodology as commonly understood . 
9. For a general discussion of this problem, see Klevorick ( 1 9 85 ) .
1 0. This approach is clearly endorsed by the empirical literature on 
criminal behavior in contexts other than tax compliance ( see 
footnote 8)  and amounts to much more than a minor "twist" on 
Becker ' s  approach . A theoretical construct that takes account of 
the structure of the law enforcement process and its relationship 
to criminal behavior is necessary before normative issues 
properly can be addressed . It is useless to ask how changes in 
the level of punishment, for example, effect criminal behavior 
without taking into account the process by which that punishment 
is impose d .  In fact, our simple model suggests - - in the tax 
compliance context at least -- that answers to these kinds of 
questions can depend crucially on the behavior of the law 
enforcement agency . 
1 1 .  There have been multi-period analyses o f  the choice o f  a penalty 
system to minimize tax evasion subject to a budget constraint 
( Greenberg, 1 983 ) , to maximize net revenue ( Landsberger and 
Meilijson, 1 982 ) , and to maximize an exogenously given social 
utility function (Rubinstein, 1 97 9 ) . These analyses have 
essentially treated the probability of audit as independent of a 
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taxpayer's reported income, although the extent of noncompliance 
depends on detection probabilities.  While detection 
probabilities are treated as uniform across taxpayers, some 
analysts have explored the optimal (uniform) probability of 
detection ( see footnote 8 ) , In some cases, the probability of 
audit is made contingent upon factors such as whether the 
taxpayer had been caught underreporting in the past ( e . g . , 
Landsberger and Meilij son, 1 982 ; Greenberg, 1 983 ; and Rubinstein, 
1 97 9 ) . 
12. In subsequent work, we expect to expand our systemic analysis to 
take into account the impact of third-party agents on the
noncompliance problem . The advisory role of attorneys,
accountants and tax return preparers, for example, cries for 
careful theoretical attention.
13 . Recent estimates of legal .sector noncompliance ( and empirical 
studies of them) almost invariably involve extrapolations from 
the TCMP. The tax understatements that are detected by the 
random audits are then extrapolated to the broader universe of 
taxpayers generally. This is not an occasion for evaluating TCMP 
in detail, but measuring aggregate noncompliance is not its 
principal function. The TCMP is principally designe? to
establish and refine IRS audit selection mechanisms, a task for 
which it is well-suited, because TCMP provides direct evidence of 
how much tax understatement (or overstatement) can be detected by 
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careful audits.  It is an excellent mechanism for assessing audit 
effectiveness, for guiding the allocation of scarce IRS audit 
resources and for predicting how many dollars of additional tax 
revenues might be produced from additional dollars spent on tax 
audi t s .  Coincidentally, it produces the best avail able data for 
estimating noncompliance , certainly better than is likely to 
emerge from surveys . But extrapolations from TCMP data to 
estimate aggregate noncompliance are necessarily subject to the 
inherent limitations of TCMP. To the extent that taxpayers 
selected for TCMP audits are able to conceal , for example ,  
unreported cash income from the TCMP auditor, extrapolated 
estimates of noncompliance wil l be understated , That TCMP 
generally misses nonfilers al together further restricted its 
val idity as a mechanism for estimating noncompliance . See Graetz 
and Wilde ( 1985 ) , 
1 4 .  Border and Sobel ( 1985)  have al so examined this probl em. Related 
principal-agent models have been analyzed in th e accounting 
li terature. For a survey of the latter, see Demski and Kreps 
( 1 982 ) and the references cited therei n .  
1 5 .  Given the equilibrium concept th at we employ, taxpayers are 
assumed to the audit strategy used by the IRS .  See the text 
accompanying footnote 1 9, infra. 
1 6 .  The assumption th at the IRS maximizes expected ne t revenue 
( rather than some measure of social welfare) reflects our 
4 8  
decision t o  take a positive rather than normative approach . This 
is not to say that government has no normative or 
redistributional goal s ,  only that these seem to us more properl y  
regarded a s  being embodied in the tax schedule itsel f o r  in 
programs which make subsequent use of tax revenue . Our 
interpretation seems consistent with the current use of expected 
"yield" oriteria for the selection of returns for audit ( e . g . , 
the TCMP program ) , See also Wertz ( 1 97 9 )  who discusses the 
appropriate IRS objective function in detail and cites several 
administrators and observers of tax administration who believe 
revenue maximization to be one of the primary goals of the IRS ,  
1 7 .  For exampl e,  Commissioner Egger has remarked : 
There has always been some resistance in this country , from 
colonial times onward, to virtual ly every form of taxation. 
As a general rule ,  with some exceptions, the resistance or 
protest was episodic and geographical ly contai ned . The system 
was never seriously threatened or weakened . From early times, 
as de Toqueville observed , most Americans had an unusual 
willingness to engage in voluntary activity for the public 
good . It can be credited in part to the "frontier mentality" 
which required cooperatio n  for survival . That wil lingness 
still exists in large part; most Amerioans do engage in the 
spirit of voluntarism and most Americans do subscribe 
voluntarily to and comply with the tax l aws to which we are 
al l subject . • • • Unfortunately, a growing number of what
are otherwise honest citizens are becoming non-persons in the 
tax system or are finding various ways to submerge parts of 
their income, so as not to have it subject to taxation. 
[ Egger ( 1 983 ) p. SJ 
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1 8 .  W e  believe that there exist a t  least two other types o f  taxpayers 
who should be considered in a complete model of tax 
noncompliance , but who we do not consider in the model set forth 
her e .  These we label : ( 1 )  the "coordinating compliers" -­
individuals who would feel duped if they thought they were 
routinely complying with the tax l aws while others were not and 
who therefore approach compliance decisions in a manner 
consistent with the way they think others are behaving; and ( 2 )  
the "noncomplying criminal s "  - - individual s who are engaged i n  
other illegal activities and whose decisions about t a x  compliance 
is related to anxillary exposure to other criminal penal ties. Al 
Capone and Spiro Agnew are probably the two best known examples 
of this latter category.  In principl e ,  these distinctions among 
types of taxpayers could be made endogenous by adding various 
"costs , "  psychic or otherwise , into taxpayers utility functions, 
but there seems li ttl e  gain in doing so.  For further discussion 
of the implications of including a variety of categories of 
taxpayers ,  see below, Part 4 . 5 .  
1 9 .  A s  wil l become clear subsequentl y ,  relaxing those two assumptions 
that income can take only two levels and that the IRS is not 
budge t-co nstrained -- increases dramatically the mathematical 
complexity of the analysis we are proposing here . Although these 
assumptions are obviously unrealistic when considering tax 
noncompliance generally, they may be adequate in evaluating tax 
enforcement within specific audit classes . 
20 . In a Nash Equilibrium , each agent ' s  str ategy is optimal , given 
the other agent ' s  equilibrium str ategy. In particul ar , this 
means th at taxpayers know the audit strategy used by the IRS. 
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For a further discussion of the reasonableness of this assumption 
see Graetz and Wilde ( 19 85 ) . 
21 . For discussion, see below, Part 4 . 4 .  
2 2 .  Our model of the interaction between taxpayers and the IRS i s  a 
standard two-state, two-action gam e ,  P ' ng ( 19 83 )  and Salant and 
Rest ( 1 982 )  have used this type of model to analyze the 
litigation of settlement demands in civil torts cases .  
Subsequently ,  Salant ( 1 984 ) has generalized the analysis t o  
include a n  interval of possible settlement demands , 
23 , We implicitly assume taxpayers can only submit reports of IL or 
IH even though , in principl e,  other reports are feasibl e ,  One 
way to r ationalize this assumption, which greatly simplifies the 
analysi s ,  is to assume taxpayers must report their income on a 
standard form which only allows them the option of indicating l ow 
or high income . At a l ess general level , the model may also be 
thought of as dealing with a particular deduction or tax credit ,  
which the taxpayer has only the option o f  taking or not claiming , 
2 4 .  Both taxes and the general structure of penalties are fixed by 
the legislative branch , although the IRS has some control over 
the choice of penalty ( e . g . , civil versus criminal ) ,  We ignore 
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the l atter distinction in this analysi s .  
2 5 .  Each taxpayer's income is a random variable which takes the high 
value with probability q and the low value with the complementary 
probability 1 - q .  I t  i s  important t o  view q as the e x  ante 
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2 9 .  A s  with audi ting , that the marginal benefits o f  noncompl iance are 
linear in the probability of noncompliance is a standard 
consequence of the assumption that taxpayers maximize expected 
utili ty .  
probability that a randomly drawn taxpayer has high income, 3 0. The notation �( � )  a [ 0, 1 ]  means the taxpayer is indifferent to
rather than the realized frequency of high income taxpayers . The any probability of noncompliance between O and 1. 
IRS is assumed to be unable to observe the realized distribution 
of income, as well as the income of any individual taxpayer. 
Under this interpretation of q ,  the realized distribution of 
reports provides no further information about the veracity of a 
given report beyond that contained in the report itsel f. 
26 . In formal terms,  we assume u ( • )  is twice-differentiable with 
u ' ( · )  > O and utt( • )  < O .  
2 7 .  This property is n o t  an artifact o f  any unusual assumptions used 
in our model but follows directly from the assumption that the 
IRS maximizes expected revenue . It is a standard feature of the 
von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility hypothesis that expected 
utility is linear in probabil ity . In this case , the returns to 
auditing wil l be linear in the probability of audi t ,  
2 8. The notation �(a) e [ 0, 1 ]  means the IRS is indifferent to any 
probabil i ty of audit between O and 1.
31. The knife-edge case of a =  1 has a continuum of equilibria. In
this situation, all strategic taxpayers underreport,  and the IRS
is indifferent regarding the probability with which it audits
taxpayers who report low income . 
3 2 .  As footnote 7 ,  above indicates, some authors have extended the 
Allingham and Sandmo model to include the labor/leisure choice of 
taxpayers in addition to the choice of how much to underreport 
income (Andersen, 1 97 7 ;  Pencavel , 1 97 9 ) . Others have introduced 
a distinction between "regular" and "irregular" labor marke ts in 
which income from the former is automatically reported ( Isachsen 
and Strom, 1 980; Sandmo, 1 981 ) . In these l atter models the 
taxpayer must decide how much labor to allocate to each market as 
well as how much irregular income to report. 
3 3 .  The probability that a randomly drawn taxpayer will b e  a 
noncomplier is given by the product of the probabil ity of being a 
strategic taxpayer ( p) times the probability of having high
income ( q )  times the probability of not complying (a) , Hence 
qpa • The probability that a randomly observed report will 
be audited is given by the product of the probabil ity that the 
report will be low income (qpa + 1 - q) times the probability
th at i t  wil l be audited (�) . Hence PA = j(qp� + 1 - q ) . 
3 4 .  See abov e ,  Part 2 .
3 5 .  That increases in the tax rate might increase compliance 
regardless of the risk preferences of taxpayers is an important 
resul t .  I t  illustrates dramatically the importance of an 
interactive model , and it also demonstrates the need for formal 
models generally. It is a fairly obvious observation that an 
increase in the tax rate should increase both the incentives t o  
underreport and the incentives t o  audi t .  But intuition alone 
cannot de termine the ul timate effect s of these conflicting 
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forces. A formal model often can, and we use the term "dominate" 
to refer to the incentive which ul timately prevails in the new 
equilibrium which results from a parametric change. 
3 6 .  As noted in Table 1 ,  if taxpayers are indifferent to risk, an 
increase in the tax on high income will increase the probability 
th at a given l ow income report wil l be audited. Whether 
aggregate auditing increases depends on the size of the fine 
r el a tive to the audit cost ; that is,  aggregate auditing increases 
or decreases as the fine is greater than or less than the audi t 
cost. 
3 7 .  Unlike increases i n  the tax on high income, a n  increase i n  the 
5 4  
tax on low income yields an unambiguous prediction regarding the 
probability that a given low income report will be audited : i t  
decreases. The effect on aggregate audi ts again depends on the 
size of the fine r elative to the audit cost ; that is, aggregate 
auditing increases or decreases as the fine is l ess than or 
greater than the audit cost . 
3 8 .  See above, Part 2 ,  
3 9 .  Expected revenue net o f  audit costs i s  
R p ) TH + p ( l  
Using the definitions of PN and PA ' this can be rewritten as 
Since PN , PA and p are al l independent of p ,  so is expected
revenue net of audit costs . 
4 0 .  I n  order t o  guarantee that the probability of noncompliance for a 
strategic taxpayer with high income is less than one (� < 1) we 
require (1 - q ) c/pq [ TH + F - TL - c] < 1 or 
p > (1 - q ) c/q [ TH + F - TL - c] . If p falls below this l evel the
equilibrium involves no auditing and no compliance by strategic 
t axpayers. In this case increases in the proportion of strategic 
taxpayers effect nothing except expected r evenue , which falls. 
41 . While this conclusion is indeed provocative,  we are not 
suggesting that it be used as the basis for policy decisions. 
The model we present in this paper is, as we have emphasized, 
designed to illustr ate the kind of results one can get from an 
interactive model. We view it as an impor tant first step, but no 
more than th at, and caution should therefore be used in applying 
the results . The result that an increase in the proportion of 
str ategic noncompliers has no effect on aggregate noncompliance 
or aggregate revenues may , for example , not be true where such an 
increase h as the effect of changing a nonbinding budget 
constraint into a binding one, even if the results described in 
the text would hold in cases where either the�e was no binding 
budget constraint or where the budget constraint was already 
binding. A model with a binding budget constraint is discussed 
below, Part 5 . 3 .  
4 2 . Allingham and Sandmo ( 1 972)  found that when the fine is 
proportional to unreported income ( that is, F = n ( I11 - IL) ) ,  an
increase in the tax rate has a both an income and a substitution 
effect . Since the substitution effect is negative ,  while the 
income effect is positive (negative ) if absolute risk aversion is 
decreasing ( i ncreasing ) ,  the net effect of an increase in the tax 
rate is ambiguous in the ( presumed most likely) case of 
decreasing absolute risk aversion. Yitzhaki ( 1 974) has noted, 
however ,  that penalties for evasion are most often proportional 
to evaded tax, not unreported income, so that the income effect 
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is spurious . Instead he finds that if absolute risk av ersion is 
a decreasing function of income , then an increase in the tax rate 
unambiguously enhances compliance . If absolute risk aversion is 
increasing with income , then Yitzhaki's result also is ambiguous. 
43 . In the case of risk-neutral taxpayers, � = 1/(1 + n ) ,  which
is independent of both tax rates and the income differential, 
while PA decreases with an increase in either of these
parameter s .  
44 . Taxpayer audit costs may include fees paid to attornies , 
accountant s ,  and other third-party agents involved in the revenue 
collection process .  These agents are outside our model s o  the 
fact that these costs are a transfer rather than a pure 
deadweight loss is irrelevant . Revenue will generally not be 
increased by such transfers because amounts that will be included 
in the recipients' taxable incomes are typically deductible to 
the payor (under Internal Revenue Code Section 212 ( 3 ) ) .  We 
ignore any revenue effects that might result because the payor 
does not itemize deductions or because payors and recipients are 
in different marginal tax bracke ts . 
4 5 .  That i s  a =  c ( l  - q ) /( TH - TL + F - c ) . 
46 . The IRS's equilibrium audit probability for low income reports 
becomes: 
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47 . For an exception see Nagin ( 197 8)  who points out th at the 
observed negative relationship between index crime rates and 
sanction l evel s  may be explained by a constraint on total prison 
popul ations, 
4 8 .  The next section will discuss these resul ts i n  more detail . 
4 9 ,  See Wertz ( 1979)  for a model which illustra'tes this point.
5 0 .  I n  formal terms w e  can express these preferences as 
where the variables are the same as in Part 3 . In particular , p 
is the probability of audit given a report of l ow income, and µ 
is the probability that a taxpayer who reports l ow income is 
actually a strategic taxpayer with high income who has 
underreported . 
51 . Audits generated by the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program 
( TCMP) are apparently based on the amount of additional tax 
revenue that is likely to be generated by an audi t ,  not on fines 
or the tax r evenue received from those taxpayers who are not 
audited . Our alternative objective function is based only on the 
amount of income that is likely to be discovered and thus 
emphasizes accuracy over revenue (see Wertz, 1 97 9 ) , If the IRS 
acted so as to maximize the total expected income known to the 
government net of audit costs, it would use the objective 
function 
TTca,p) = p[µIH + ( 1  - µ ) IL - c l  + (1 - p) IL ' 
5 8  
This would yield precisely the same audit and noncompliance rates 
as the alternative objective function discussed in the text and 
specified in footnote 5 0 ,  supra. 
52 . The probability of noncompliance by strategic taxpayers with high 
income is now 
a= ( 1  - q ) c /pq ( IH - IL - c ) , 
The textual assertion may be tested by comparing this expression 
for the equilibrium probability of audit given a report of low 
income to the analogous expression in our basic model . 
53 . The critical value of the fine is defined by 
F* = IH - IL - TH + TL . Recall that we assume F { IH - TH ; that
is, the IRS cannot take more income from noncompliers than they 
hav e .  But F* { IH - TH i f  and only if TL � IL ' which w e  also
assume . In other words , there always exist feasible l evels of 
the fine both above and below the critical value . 
5 4 .  I f  the IRS ignores tax rates and fines in determining its audit 
pol icy, those factor s ,  at l east in our simple model , wil l have no 
effect on the probabil ity of compliance . This is because 
taxpayers behave in a way that responds to IRS audit incentives, 
5 9  
in equil ibrium generating neither too much or too l ittle 
auditing , Tax rates and fines,  however ,  may stil l affect the 
equilibrium l evel of auditing because auditing responds 
indirectly to strategic taxpayers ' incentives to underrepor t ,  and 
these incentives will still be affected by tax rates and fine s .  
5 5 .  For further discussion, s e e  Graetz and Wilde ( 1 985 ) , 
56 . For a discussion of the existing empirical literature on tax 
compliance see Graetz and Wilde ( 1 9 85 ) . 
5 7 . Levels of noncompl iance depend on a number of fact ors, lncluding, 
for exam pl e ,  the likelihood of audi t ,  At the same time, the 
likelihood of audit depends on the level of noncompl iance . Thus 
it is inappropriate to use the likelihood of audit as an 
exogenous variable to estimate an equation meant to explain the 
causes of noncompliance . Technical ly, the results in such a case 
are said to be subject to "simultaneity bias . "  As an empirical 
matter this problem can be overcome by including an additional 
equation which explains the probability of audit as a function of 
l evels of noncompliance and other factors such as IRS resources .
Thi s ,  however , has not yet been done. An example of the 
potential problem with simul taneity bias is provided by Witte and 
Woodbury ( 19 85 ) , These authors, working with 1 96 9  TCMP data, 
include audit r ates and sanction levels as explanatory variables 
in an empirical analysis of compliance , but fail to deal with the 
simul taneity probl em .  They , i n  fact , find that for some taxpayer 
classes the probability of a civ il fraud penalty is negatively 
related to voluntary compl iance . This may be explained by 
simultaneity bias , but may also be explained by the failure of 
audit rates to accurately proxy the likel'ihood of detection. 
6 0 
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Table 1 
Direction of change in the endogenous variables (row entries ) given an increase in the 
exogenous parameters ( column entries ) :  the basic model . No change is denoted by a zero . 
Endogenous Variable 
Indivi dual probability 
of noncompl iance (a) 
Aggregate probabil ity 
of noncompl i ance ( PN ) 
Jndividual probabi l i ty 
of aud i t  (fl) 
Aggregate probability 
of audit ( PA ) 
Fine 
( F )  
Cost of 
Audit 
( c )  
+ 
+ 
0 
+ 
Exogenous Parameter to be 
Probabil ity Tax on 
of High High 
Income Income 
(q) ( TH ) 
0 
•• 
Increased 
Tax on Percentage 
Low of Strategl.c 
Income Taxpayers 
( TL) ( p) 
--- -- - -
+ 
+ 0 
0 
• •  0 
• ambiguous in general ; when taxpayers are risk-neutral , this entry is + ,
•• ambiguous i n  general ; when taxpayers are risk-neut r al , 
a PA /a TH = - a PA/a TL L o  ( f  O) as F L  c (f c ) .
6 8  
Table 2 
Direction of change in the endogenous variables ( row entri e s )  given an 
increase in the exogenous parameters ( column entries ) : proportional 
tax and fines . 
Endogenous 
Variable 
Individual probability of 
noncompli ance (a) 
Aggregate probabli t y  of 
noncompliance ( PN) 
Individual probablity 
of aud i t  (Ill 
Aggregate probabl ity 
of aud i t  ( PA ) 
Exogenous Parameter to be Increased 
Penal ty Rate 
( 11 )  
Tax Rate 
( t )  
•• 
Income Differential 
( IH - IL ) 
• 
• •  
• ambiguous i n  general ; when taxpayers are risk-neutral , these entries
are O .  
• •  ambiguous i n  general ; when taxpayers are risk-neutral , these 
entries are -
Nature 
determ i nes 
i n c o m e  
Tax payer 
repor ts  
I R S
Strateg i c
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Figure 2 :  Bes t response functions in the basic model when a ?  1 .
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Figure 3:  B e s t  response functions in t h e  basic model when a < 1 .
